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ABSTRACT
Firms that maintain no formal record of actions and events would hardly be considered well
managed. Yet, organizations that require the recording of actions and the filing of reports are often
labeled “bureaucratic” and inefficient. This paper argues that the thin line between efficient
management practices and inefficient bureaucracy is crossed to curb managerial agency costs in a
multi-layer hierarchy. The model predicts that bureaucracy increases with the frequency of
managerial turnover, and it establishes a link between bureaucracy, incentive schemes, and leverage
in a cross-section of firms.
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Weber (1968, p. 957) argues that “the management of the modern oﬃce is based upon written
documents (‘the ﬁles’), which are preserved in their original or draft form.” In his view, a
ﬁrm that maintains no formal record of actions and events would hardly be considered well
managed. Yet, organizations that require the recording of actions and the ﬁling of reports are
often labelled “bureaucratic” and ineﬃcient. This paper explores the balance between eﬃcient
management practices and ineﬃcient bureaucracy. We show that this thin line is crossed to
curb managerial agency problems in a multi-layer hierarchy.
In our model, a ﬁrm is run by a self-interested manager who, by organizing production,
determines the extent to which employees’ actions can be documented. Documenting actions
is important because it allows for more eﬀective incentive schemes. In organizing production,
therefore, the manager must take into account that employees’ eﬀort should be used not only
to increase production but also to maintain a system of incentives.
To better understand some of the trade-oﬀs involved in improving a system of incentives,
consider a commercial bank. The management of the bank can give loan oﬃcers complete
discretion to approve loans, paying the oﬃcers solely on the basis of their portfolios’ returns.
Such organizational design probably maximizes the focus of the oﬃcers’ eﬀort on the bank’s
customers. Nonetheless, since the ex-post returns of a portfolio of loans is a noisy measure of
performance, this compensation scheme imposes a great amount of risk on the loan oﬃcers.
Alternatively, the bank could develop an information system that tracks employees’ actions,
generating information on the soundness of the loan oﬃcers’ decision making process. In this
alternative, loan oﬃcers may be rewarded not only for the returns of their portfolios but also
on the basis of input-based performance measures that are more tightly linked to their actions:
Did they try their best in evaluating the clients? Did they meet the bank’s guidelines? This
1broader compensation scheme imposes a lower risk on the loan oﬃcers, making it easier to
elicit eﬀort.
Organizing an information system that documents corporate events also entails costs, how-
ever. For instance, although loan oﬃcers may ﬁnd it useful to register conversations with their
clients, avoiding ex post manipulations of these records is likely to require that loan oﬃcers
write their reports not too long after a conversation takes place. Deadlines imply a loss of
ﬂexibility that aﬀects the way that loan oﬃcers work. Hence, there exists a trade-oﬀ between
eﬀective incentive schemes and production eﬃciency.
Firms become overly bureaucratized when this trade-oﬀ is biased toward the beneﬁts of
improving incentives, implying the recording of corporate actions and events in too much
detail. But why should this bias exist? We shall argue that the bias is an optimal response to
managerial agency costs in a multi-layer organization.
Consider a three-layer hierarchy. The ﬁrst layer (Board of Directors) chooses the incen-
tive schemes for the second layer (manager) and the third layer (employee). The employee’s
contribution to the ﬁrm’s production consists of an unobservable action, which we henceforth
call eﬀort. In turn, the manager organizes production, a task that determines the eﬃciency
of the ﬁrm’s information system. In making this organizational choice, the manager knows
that a costly adjustment in the ﬁrm’s production technology may increase the precision of an
input-based signal of the employee’s performance.
Besides the standard problem of providing incentives for the employee to exert eﬀort,
there is an agency problem at the manager’s level. As Shleifer and Vishny (1989) point out,
managers may choose projects that rely more heavily on their skills just to increase their
bargaining power in a wage renegotiation. Likewise, managers may organize the ﬁrm in a way
that their continuation at the company’s helm is important to the employees’ incentives. To
understand what type of distortion this agency problem may imply, suppose that the ﬁrm is
2organized in a way that the employee’s actions are recorded at a very high level of detail. The
input-based measure of performance will then be very precise, making the employee conﬁdent
that his eﬀort will be rewarded despite events, like managerial turnover, that are outside his
control. As a ﬁrst approximation, the eﬀectiveness of the system of incentives of a highly
bureaucratized ﬁrm is independent of the manager’s identity.
In contrast, a less bureaucratized ﬁrm has to rely more strongly on broader measures
of performance (e.g., proﬁts) to motivate the employee. This system of incentives is likely
to be disrupted by managerial turnover. For instance, an employee under a proﬁt-sharing
compensation scheme may reduce eﬀort if he realizes that proﬁts will fall upon the hiring of
a less eﬃcient manager. The system of incentives of a less bureaucratized ﬁrm, therefore, is
more severely disrupted by managerial turnover, making it more prone to be held up by the
manager. To maximize her bargaining power vis-` a-vis the Board of Directors, it is then in the
manager’s interest to bias the ﬁrm’s organization toward very little record keeping, that is, an
excessive degree of informality.
Whether this bias translates into an excessively informal organization depends upon the
manager’s own incentive schemes. Anticipating this bias, shareholders will want to link the
manager’s compensation to her choice of the ﬁrm’s organization.
Yet, the optimal compensation contract will not implement an eﬃcient organizational
design. In an eﬃcient organizational choice, the manager’s quitting threat is not taken into
account. In fact, eﬃciency ignores any transfer between the shareholders and the manager,
focusing instead on the trade-oﬀ between production eﬃciency and incentives. From the view
point of the shareholders, nonetheless, it pays to distort the organizational design to reduce
transfers to the manager. As a result, shareholders distort the trade-oﬀ between production
eﬃciency and generation of information toward the latter to improve the precision of the input-
based measure of performance. An excessively bureaucratic organization thus arises to reduce
3the manager’s bargaining power. In other words, the best way to address a manager’s bias
toward very little record keeping implies the distortion of the organization in the direction of
excessive record keeping.
Our paper builds upon a growing literature that views bureaucracy as a restriction on
employees’ behavior meant to reduce the cost of providing them with incentives. The papers
in this literature share a common view on the ﬁnal beneﬁts of bureaucracy, but they diﬀer on
how these beneﬁts are achieved. In Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), bureaucratic rules reduce
the cost of providing incentives because they restrict other activities that the employees would
like to do, and in so doing they reduce their opportunity cost of eﬀort. In Tirole (1986, 1992),
rules reduce managers’ discretion, decreasing the scope for collusion and, thus, reducing the
cost of providing incentives.1 In Prendergast and Topel (1996), bureaucracy is a rule that
distorts the weight attributed to a manager’s report on her subordinate’s performance. This
distortion reduces the scope for favoritism in the organization. Finally, in Milgrom (1988)
and Milgrom and Roberts (1990), bureaucracy precludes employees from inﬂuencing their
supervisors’ decisions, reducing wasteful rent-seeking.
In all these papers, the role of bureaucracy is either to destroy or to commit to ignore rele-
vant information. By contrast, in our model, bureaucratic procedures — like the management
by written documents that Weber describes — generate veriﬁable information, which can be
used to improve the eﬃciency of incentive schemes. Thus, we focus on the role of bureau-
cracy as a mechanism to generate information. Perhaps more importantly, our model leads
to new empirical implications. For example, while Tirole (1986) suggests that bureaucracy is
negatively correlated with managerial turnover, our model predicts a positive correlation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
1The eﬀect of rules on collusion is not unequivocal. If there is asymmetry of information between the manager
and the employee, Felli (1996) shows that rules may actually increase collusion.
4characterizes eﬃcient organizational choices and it obtains a one-to-one mapping between a
ﬁrm’s degree of bureaucratization and the extent to which employees’ pay depends on measures
of input rather than output. Section 4 explains why delegating the ﬁrm’s organizational
design to a self-interested manager generates an agency problem. Section 5 shows how overly
bureaucratic ﬁrms arise in equilibrium. Section 6 discusses the empirical implications, and a
conclusion follows in Section 7.
2 Framework
We consider a ﬁrm with a three-layer hierarchy: an employee whose contribution to production
consists of his unobservable eﬀort; a self-interested manager who, by organizing production,
determines the extent to which the employee’s contribution to the ﬁrm is veriﬁable; and a
Board of Directors that acts in the interest of shareholders and makes sure that the ﬁrm is
under optimal incentive schemes.
Cash ﬂow, preferences, and organizational design
Our main interest in this paper is to investigate a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency in production
and generation of information. To characterize this trade-oﬀ, we relate the ﬁrm’s cash-ﬂow to
the employee’s incentive to exert eﬀort, which is the ultimate reason for producing information
in our model.
At one extreme, the manager can organize production to maximize the impact of the
employee’s eﬀort on production. In this case, the ﬁrm’s output is described by a stochastic
production function, x(a), that depends on the employee’s eﬀort, a. We assume that x(a) is
5normally distributed with mean a and standard deviation σ < ∞:
x(a) ∼ N(a,σ).
By organizing the ﬁrm in this way, the manager generates only one signal of the employee’s
eﬀort: the output itself. This represents a problem to the Board because, as in the standard
Principal-Agent models, eﬀort is unobservable for outsiders and costly for the employee. More
precisely, the employee’s preferences over eﬀort, a, and income, w, are represented by
U(w,a) = −e−r(w−c(a)),
where r is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, and c : <+ → <+ is a convex and twice
continuously diﬀerentiable cost function with c(0) = 0, c0(a) > 0 for a > 0, and c0(0) = 0.
For the employee to exert eﬀort, his compensation would have to be linked to the sole
signal of eﬀort, that is, the noisy output x. Since the employee is risk averse, shareholders
must compensate him not only for the disutility of eﬀort but also for the riskiness of the
contract.
As Holmstrom (1979) demonstrates, the Board can enhance the eﬃciency of the employee’s
contract by including other measures of eﬀort that are not perfectly correlated with output.
Let us then call y an input-based measure of the employee’s performance, with
y ∼ N(a,λ).
We assume that, conditioned on the employee’s eﬀort, y and x are independent. As a result,
the value of the input-based measure of performance, y, is high if its standard deviation λ is
low.
In our model, the standard deviation of the input-based measure of performance, λ, sum-
marizes the ﬁrm’s organizational design. The input-based measure of performance has a low
6standard deviation in ﬁrms that organize production so that employees’ actions are docu-
mented in detail. In contrast, an organizational design that maximizes production eﬃciency
implies such a large standard deviation, call it λmax, that, for all practical purposes, makes y
a useless signal of the employee’s eﬀort. Increasing the precision of input-based performance
measures thus implies sacriﬁcing production eﬃciency.
To illustrate the interaction between production eﬃciency and input-based measures of
performance, let us revisit the loan oﬃcer example. The soundness of a loan oﬃcer’s decision-
making process amounts to an input-based measure of performance. Of course, this perfor-
mance measure will be meaningless unless the bank tracks the oﬃcer’s lending practices. Doing
so requires, among other things, that the loan oﬃcer document conversations with clients and
provide reasons for credit approvals. Moreover, avoiding ex post manipulation of these reports
requires inspections that change not only the loan oﬃcers’ routine but also the job assignments
of other employees in the bank. Clearly, such organizational design does not maximize the
focus of the employees’ eﬀorts on the bank’s customers.
We model the production costs associated with input-based performance measures by a
twice continuously diﬀerentiable function Γ : (λmin,λmax] → <+. If the Board organizes the
ﬁrm to maximize production eﬃciency, then λ = λmax with Γ(λmax) = 0. If, instead, the Board
sacriﬁces production to increase the precision of the input-based measure of performance, then
λ < λmax and Γ(λ) > 0. In other words, Γ(λ) is a decreasing function of λ.
To assure interior solutions, we also assume that Γ(λ) is a convex function with Γ0(λmax) =
0, and limλ→λminΓ(λ) = ∞. The ﬁrm’s output is then characterized by a function, x0(a,λ),
that depends on the employee’s eﬀort, a, and the organizational choice, λ, as follows:
x0(a,λ) = x(a) − Γ(λ).
For simplicity, shareholders and the manager are risk neutral. Hence, from the perspective
7of the shareholders, the optimal organizational choice maximizes expected proﬁts. More inter-
estingly, we shall show in Section 4 that the manager has incentive to distort the organizational
design, despite assuming that the act of organizing the ﬁrm does not directly aﬀect her utility
function. Of course, selling the ﬁrm to the manager would eliminate her incentive to deviate
from value-maximizing actions. To rule out this uninteresting solution to the agency problem,
we assume that the manager is credit constrained. The manager has to remain as an employee
of the shareholders, who must impose an incentive scheme on the manager to prevent her from
distorting the ﬁrm’s organizational design.
Timing
Figure 1 outlines the timing of the model and its main events. At date t = 0, the Board
chooses the manager’s and the employee’s compensation schemes to maximize expected proﬁts.
Contracts can be written on three variables: the output, x0, the input-based signal of the
employee’s eﬀort, y, and the organizational choice, λ.
Figure 1: Timing of events













Changing a ﬁrm’s organizational structure is likely to require time. Accordingly, one would
expect that, once the manager implements the organizational design, there is a time lag to
change it. In our single-production-period model, this time lag implies that the manager
8irreversibly chooses the organizational design at date t = 1, when the precision of the input-
based measure of performance is also sunk.2
In contrast, we assume that the incentive contracts can be renegotiated at date t = 2 after
the manager implements the organizational design. This asymmetry lets us focus on the agency
costs associated with the organizational design, as opposed to the literature on bureaucracy
that focuses on the impact of collusive agreements on the optimal incentive schemes. (See,
for instance, Tirole (1986) and Prendergast and Topel (1996).) Finally, output, x0, and the
input-based measure of performance, y, realize at date t = 3 after the employee exerts eﬀort.
3 Organizational Design
This section characterizes an eﬃcient organizational design as a solution to a trade-oﬀ between
the costs and beneﬁts of increasing the precision of the input-based measure of performance.
We solve this trade-oﬀ backwards. For any given organizational choice, we ﬁnd the employee’s
optimal incentive scheme. This contract determines the ﬁrm’s value as a function of the
organizational design. An eﬃcient organizational choice maximizes this value function.
The employee’s contract
Given a ﬁrm’s organizational choice, λ, the employee’s optimal contract solves
max
{w(.,.),a}
E[x − Γ(λ) − w(x − Γ(λ),y);a,λ,σ]
2While we agree that managerial turnover is likely to precipitate organizational changes, managers who want
to use a quitting threat to obtain salary raises will do so when the threat is strong. Since the quitting threat
is likely to be strong when the ﬁrms‘ reorganization costs are high, assuming that the organizational design is
sunk may be interpreted as the incumbent optimally choosing the time to renegotiate the salary.
9subject to (IR) E[−e−r(w(.,.)−c(a));a,λ,σ] ≥ −1,
(IC) a ∈ argmaxa∈<+E[−e−r(w(.,.)−c(a));a,λ,σ].
The objective function is the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt gross of the manager’s wage. When
solving for the employee’s optimal contract, we can ignore the manager’s salary because all
of her actions are sunk at the time that eﬀort has to be elicited. Thus, any distortion that
the manager’s salary may impose on the employee’s eﬀort would be renegotiated away at the
proper time. The participation constraint (IR) assures that the contract satisﬁes the employee’s
reservation value, which we assume to be -1, while the incentive compatibility constraint (IC)
provides the correct incentives for the employee to exert eﬀort.
For simplicity, we restrict attention to linear compensation contracts:
w(x0,y) = α + β1x0 + β2y.
Thanks to the linearity of the contract, we can replace the incentive compatibility con-
straint (IC) by the ﬁrst order condition of the employee’s eﬀort decision. Furthermore, the
participation constraint (IR) will be binding (because the objective function decreases with
the manager’s wage), allowing us to substitute it into the objective function. As a result, we
can rewrite the program as
max
{β1,β2,a}





2λ2] − Γ(λ) (1)
subject to c0(a) = β1 + β2.
The ﬁrst order conditions (which are also suﬃcient) of program (1) are
1 − c0(a)[1 + r
(σλ)2









The ﬁrst order conditions imply the standard under-provision of eﬀort; the optimal contract
sacriﬁces some eﬀort to reduce the dollar amount that should be paid to the employee as a
compensation for the risk imposed by the incentive contract. Moreover, since an increase in the
volatility of output, σ, makes the output-based measure of performance noisier, the optimal
response is to decrease the weight of output, β1, in the employee’s compensation.
The impact of an increase in the volatility of the output on the weight of the input-
based measure, β2, is ambiguous. Increasing the volatility of output imposes more risk on
the employee. To facilitate risk sharing, the optimal contract induces a lower level of eﬀort
which, in turn, reduces the urge for a high power incentive scheme. Thus, an increase in the
volatility of output may result in a lower weight on the input-based performance measure y.
Still, dividing equations (3) and (4) yields equation (5), below, which shows that, upon an
increase in the volatility of the output, the weight of the input-based performance measure









Analogous results follow for an increase in the volatility λ of the input-based measure of






1(λ,σ) decreases, while the eﬀect on β?
1 is ambiguous.
Organizational design and bureaucracy
Given an organizational choice λ and the volatility σ of the ﬁrm’s output, let the expected
proﬁt (gross of the manager’s salary) be V (λ,σ) − Γ(λ), where
V (λ,σ) ≡ max
{a,β1,β2}





2λ2)] subject to c0(a) = β1 + β2. (6)
11An eﬃcient organizational design solves
max
λ∈(λmin,λmax]
V (λ,σ) − Γ(λ). (7)
As it turns out, it pays to distort production eﬃciency to improve the ﬁrm’s system of




2λ, which is negative for any λ ∈ (λmin,λmax]. Since, by assumption,
∂Γ(λmax)
∂λ = 0, expected proﬁts increase if production is marginally distorted (λ < λmax) to
increase the precision of the input-based measure of performance.
It then follows that any solution to Program (7) must lie in the open interval (λmin,λmax),







Because V (λ,σ) − Γ(λ) is not necessarily quasi-concave, there may be multiple equilibria
in the organizational design problem. Two eﬃciently organized ﬁrms, therefore, may present
diﬀerent degrees of bureaucracy. As such, we will say that ﬁrm A is more bureaucratized than
ﬁrm B if the organizational design of ﬁrm A ends up documenting the employee’s actions at a
greater level of detail, leading to a lower volatility of the input-based measure of performance,
that is, λA < λB.
From equation (5), if ﬁrms A and B have the same volatility of output but ﬁrm A is more
















3To solve Program (7), we can restrict attention to values of λ in the interval [λ
min + ,λ
max] , where 
is as close to zero as needed. This restriction on the opportunity set is without loss of generality because
V (λ,σ) ≤ maxa{a − c(a)} < ∞, Γ
0(λ) < 0, and limλ→λminΓ(λ) = ∞. Existence of a solution to Program (7)
then follows from continuity of the expected proﬁt and compactness of [λ
min + ,λ
max].
12Conditioned on the volatility of output, σ, there is then a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween a ﬁrm’s degree of bureaucratization and the relative slopes of the employee’s incentive
scheme: The more bureaucratized a ﬁrm is, the larger the importance of input-based measures
of performance in the employee’s compensation.
While it is hard to diﬀerentiate between types of organizational design, it should be less
diﬃcult to measure the outcome of a bureaucratic system, that is, the extent to which em-
ployees’ pay depends on measures of input rather than output. Our framework thus yields
an empirical proxy for a company’s degree of bureaucratization: the relative weights of the
input and output measures of performance. According to this measure of bureaucracy, a more
bureaucratic bank will make a loan oﬃcer’s compensation scheme more sensitive to how well
he follows the bank’s credit procedures, while the compensation of a less bureaucratic bank
will be more sensitive to the proﬁts of the oﬃcer’s portfolio.
4 Conﬂicts of Interest in the Level of Bureaucracy
The manager’s quitting threat
Even if the managerial labor market is competitive, once in control, a manager has many ways
to acquire some power vis-` a-vis the Board and use it to extract rents in a wage renegotiation.4
To focus our attention on the costs and beneﬁts of producing information, we model the source
of the manager’s power by assuming that the volatility of output increases with the manager’s
departure. With a noisier measure of performance, the employee’s incentive scheme becomes
less eﬀective, leading to a drop in proﬁtability. By threatening to impose this loss on the ﬁrm,
a manager can negotiate a higher wage.
4Shleifer and Vishny (1989), for instance, suggest that an appropriate selection of which projects to undertake
would make the manager more indispensable to the ﬁrm’s operations.
13Our loan oﬃcer example may help illustrate the interaction between managerial turnover
and volatility of output. One of the roles of a loan oﬃcer is to detect early credit problems
and take appropriate remedial actions (e.g., making sure that, in case of default, the bank
will be able to seize any collateral). Deciding whether to act on a signal of credit problems
is often a subjective call, though. On the one hand, early actions may reduce the bank’s
loss in case the ﬁrm becomes ﬁnancially distressed. On the other hand, they may jeopardize
a proﬁtable business relationship. Accordingly, one would expect that loan oﬃcers share
remedial management decisions with their supervisors, who, in turn, have to rely on the loan
oﬃcers’ beliefs to make the decisions.
Conceivably, a conservative loan oﬃcer is likely to draw a less rosy picture of the client’s
ﬁnancial situation than a more marketing oriented oﬃcer would. Hence, supervisors should
take into account their subordinates’ characteristics when deciding whether to take early reme-
dial actions. Clearly, a new supervisor who has not had enough time to know the loan oﬃcer
will be at disadvantage on this regard. Managerial turnover should thus imply a reduction
in the expected return of the oﬃcer’s portfolio and an increase in the volatility of returns.
For simplicity, we ignore the mean eﬀect and concentrate on the increased variance.5 Output
under a replacement manager is then equal to
xR(a) − Γ(λ) ∼ N(a − Γ(λ), ¯ σ),
with ¯ σ > σ.
To facilitate risk sharing, the optimal employee’s contract responds to a higher volatility
of output by eliciting a lower level of eﬀort. This reduction of eﬀort moves the ﬁrm away from
5This assumption is consistent with Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), who ﬁnd an increase in the volatility
of stock returns around a managerial turnover event but no abnormal stock returns. Matthew, Hartzell, and
Rosenberg (2000) also ﬁnd that CEO turnover signiﬁcantly increases the volatility of stock returns.
14the ﬁrst best, reducing its value by:6
[V (λ,σ) − Γ(λ)] − [V (λ, ¯ σ) − Γ(λ)] = V (λ,σ) − V (λ, ¯ σ) > 0.
Note that the reduction in ﬁrm value will be higher if the Board does not renegotiate
the employee’s contract. After all, V (λ, ¯ σ) — the ﬁrm’s value after optimally resetting the
employee’s contract — is an upper bound under the higher volatility ¯ σ. Whether the employee’s
contract is reset or not, the loss in value associated with managerial turnover gives some
bargaining power to the incumbent manager, who can threaten to quit if she does not obtain
a salary raise.
As in Shleifer and Vishny (1989), we assume that any salary negotiation between the
Board and the manager will be eﬃciently resolved, with the manager staying in the ﬁrm and
capturing a fraction φ ∈ (0,1] of the loss that her departure would have imposed on the ﬁrm’s
value. One interpretation for the manager’s ability to extract a pay raise is that outsiders may
think that the drop in ﬁrm value after managerial turnover is the result of the loss of a skillful
manager. Accordingly, the manager’s payoﬀ from the renegotiation game may be viewed as
the present value of the increase in the incumbent manager’s outside option upon managerial
turnover.
For any given organizational choice λ, the manager will try to renegotiate whenever her ex-
pected salary is below φ{V (λ,σ)−V (λ, ¯ σ)}; a threshold that takes into account that the Board
will optimally reset the employee’s compensation contract in case of managerial turnover.
Organizational design and managerial rent
So far,we have just pointed out that, left unchecked, the manager’s quitting threat assures her
6To show that an increase in the volatility of output reduces value after optimally resetting the employee’s







15some rents. Do the rents aﬀect the manager’s choice of the organizational design? We now
show that, under a mild assumption, the manager can enhance the quitting threat by running
an excessively informal ﬁrm.
Let ¯ λeff be the most informal organizational design that maximizes ﬁrm value (i.e., ¯ λeff
is the largest solution to Program (7)). For any bargaining power φ > 0, the manager’s gain
in a salary renegotiation increases with the loss that managerial turnover causes to the ﬁrm’s
value. Hence, the manager has incentives to run an excessively informal ﬁrm (λ > ¯ λeff)
if bureaucracy reduces the eﬃciency loss associated with her departure. Using the envelope








The above inequality holds if and only if
∂β1(λ,σ)
∂λ > 0. Intuitively, a more informal organiza-
tional choice (higher λ) increases the loss that the manager’s departure imposes on shareholders
if it makes the employee’s contract rely more heavily on the output-based measure of perfor-














∂λ > 0 if and only if
∂β2(λ,σ)
∂σ > 0.




∂σ are ambiguous. These
signs are ambiguous because an increase in volatility enhances the risk borne by the employee,
making the optimal incentive scheme elicit a lower amount of eﬀort. Less powerful incentive
schemes result, implying that, for example, β2(λ,σ) may decrease with the volatility of output,
despite a higher relative precision of the input-based measure of performance.
Assumption 1, below, imposes a lower bound on the sensitivity of the employee’s eﬀort with
16respect to the volatility of output. This lower bound, which depends on the curvature of the
employee’s cost function, assures that the weight of the input-based measure of performance,
β?
2, increases with the volatility of output.
Assumption 1. For any eﬀort a, the employee’s cost of exerting eﬀort satisﬁes
ac00(a)
c0(a) ≤ k ∈ <+.







Given Assumption 1, which is satisﬁed by the quadratic cost function when λmin ≥ σ, we
have:7
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, the manager has incentive to run an excessively informal
organization. If ˜ λ is the manager’s unconstrained organizational choice and ¯ λeff is the most
informal eﬃcient organizational design then,
¯ λeff < ˜ λ ∈ argmaxλ∈(λmin,λmax]φ{V (λ,σ) − V (λ, ¯ σ)}.
Proof. See the Appendix.
From Proposition 1, the manager has incentive to run an excessively informal ﬁrm. (See
Edlin and Stiglitz (1995) and Prendergast (1995) for two other examples of how managers may
reduce ﬁrm value to extract salary concessions.) To prevent the manager from distorting the
organizational design, the Board must give her an incentive contract. A salary s(λ) that is
contingent on the organizational choice appears as a natural candidate for an optimal incentive
scheme. In particular, one might think that, under a competitive managerial labor market,
7The exponential cost function does not satisfy
ac00(a)
c0(a) ≤ k ∈ <+ if the set of employee’s eﬀort is unbounded.
Yet, the weight of the input-based measure of performance, β2(λ,σ), increases with σ if c(a) = e
a −1. In other
words, Assumption 1 is suﬃcient but not necessary.
17the ﬁrst best obtains under a forced contract that pays the manager her reservation value if
and only if she chooses an eﬃcient organizational structure.
Note, however, that if we realistically assume that a contract that penalizes an employee for
quitting is not enforceable, then the manager can choose an eﬃcient organizational structure
and still threaten to quit. Therefore, a contract that elicits an eﬃcient choice λeff must give
the manager a rent that is at least equal to
φ{V (λeff,σ) − V (λeff, ¯ σ)}.
If the manager is unable to pay up front the value of her future rents, shareholders may
ﬁnd it too costly (in terms of managerial rents) to elicit an eﬃcient organization design. In
fact, as the next section shows, shareholders are better oﬀ with an organizational design that
is overly bureaucratized.
5 Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Reduce Managerial Rents
The Board’s problem at date 0 is to maximize the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts by choosing an
organizational design, λsb, and a compensation scheme that pays the manager s(λsb) if λsb is
implemented and a harsh penalty otherwise. The compensation scheme, therefore, is not a
smooth function of the manager’s organizational choice. In this setting, the Board will solve
max
{s(λ),λ}
V (λ,σ) − Γ(λ) − s(λ)
subject to s(λ) ≥ φ{V (λ,σ) − V (λ, ¯ σ)}.
The objective function is the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt at date t = 0 given the Board’s choice
of the manager’s incentive compensation, s(λ), and the organizational design λ. The board
chooses the compensation scheme and the organizational design to maximize expected proﬁts
18while satisfying the manager’s participation constraint. In other words, given the pair (s(.),λ),
the manager should not have incentive to breach the contract, asking for a pay raise under a
quitting threat.
Since the manager’s compensation decreases the expected proﬁts, the participation con-
straint will be binding at the optimum. After replacing the constraint in the objective function,
the Board’s problem becomes
max
{λ∈(λmin,λmax]}
V (λ,σ) − Γ(λ) − φ[V (λ,σ) − V (λ, ¯ σ)]. (9)
From equation (9), one can easily see that the manager’s compensation schedule is irrel-
evant to the Board’s decision. All that matters is the manager’s reservation value, which is
a function of the ﬁrm’s organizational design. As such, the compensation scheme s(λ) may
be interpreted as the manager’s expected payoﬀ from any contract that elicits the desired
organizational choice λ. For instance, s(λ) may be the manager’s expected payoﬀ from some
sharing rule that splits the ﬁrm’s proﬁts between the manager and shareholders. The only
requirement is that the sharing rule alone cannot eliminate all agency problems, as it would
be the case if shareholders could sell the ﬁrm to the manager.












(λsb, ¯ σ)]. (10)
As Proposition 2 shows, any solution to Program (9) implies that the ﬁrm will be overly
bureaucratized.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, the shareholders’ choice of the organizational design
implies that the ﬁrm will be overly bureaucratized, that is, if λsb solves Program 9 and λeff
is the most bureaucratized organizational design that maximizes ﬁrm value, then λsb < λeff.
19Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is simple. Since the disruption of incentive schemes upon
managerial turnover is the source of the manager’s bargaining power, minimizing this dis-
ruption reduces managerial rents. Bureaucracy provides one way to reduce the disruption
of managerial turnover on the ﬁrm’s system of incentives. Thus, reducing managerial rents
induces the Board to choose an organizational design that is overly bureaucratized.
6 Extensions and Discussion
Bureaucracy and managerial turnover
In our basic model, the incumbent manager is not replaced in equilibrium. Yet, managerial
turnover is a relatively common corporate event. Denis and Denis (1995), for instance, report a
17% managerial turnover rate for a sample of 1,689 ﬁrms in the Value Line Sample. There are
several reasons for managerial turnover to occur. For one, managers do not live for ever; with
age comes retirement and death. Moreover, changes in the business environment may require
new managerial skills, leading shareholders to replace the incumbent management despite the
weakening of the system of incentives.
To investigate the interaction between managerial turnover and the organizational-design
problem, let Π be an exogenous probability of managerial turnover. For instance, Π may
reﬂect the probability that some change in the business environment requires managerial skills
that the current manager does not have. Given Π, the Board should choose the manager’s
compensation scheme and the organizational design to solve
max
{s(λ),λ}
(1 − Π){V (λ,σ) − Γ(λ) − s(λ)} + Π{V (λ, ¯ σ) − Γ(λ) − s(λ)} (11)
20subject to s(λ) ≥ φ(1 − Π){V (λ,σ) − V (λ, ¯ σ)}. (12)
As in Section 5, the objective function is the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt. The ﬁrst term in
brackets is the expected proﬁt conditioned on the continuation of the incumbent manager,
which is an event with probability 1 − Π. The second term in brackets is the ﬁrm’s expected
proﬁt conditioned on managerial turnover, which causes a disruption of the system of incentives
that reduces the ﬁrm’s value to V (λ, ¯ σ) − Γ(λ) − s(λ). This reduction in value captures the
shareholders’ cost with managerial turnover.
The manager’s participation constraint (equation (12)) captures shareholders’ gain from
the probability of managerial turnover. With probability Π, the manager’s decision to quit
will be irrelevant to the ﬁrm’s value because, in this event, the Board will take the initiative
to trigger managerial turnover. Accordingly, the manager’s reservation value is reduced by
φΠ{V (λ,σ) − V (λ, ¯ σ)}.
Expected proﬁts decrease with the manager’s compensation, implying that the partici-




(1 − Π)V (λ,σ) + ΠV (λ, ¯ σ) − Γ(λ) − φ(1 − Π)[V (λ,σ) − V (λ, ¯ σ)], (13)







(λ?, ¯ σ) =
∂Γ(λ?)
∂λ






(λ?, ¯ σ)]. (14)
As Proposition 3 shows, Program (13) implies that the probability Π of managerial turnover
increases bureaucracy and decreases managerial rents.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, the probability Π of managerial turnover increases bu-
reaucracy (i.e., ∂λ?
∂Π < 0) and decreases managerial rents.
21Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is straightforward. If managerial turnover will happen
regardless of the incumbent manager’s will, his quitting threat is obviously weakened. In
addition, a positive probability of managerial turnover induces the Board to increase the
eﬀectiveness of the system of incentives, making the ﬁrm more bureaucratic and less sensitive
to the continuation of the manager at the company’s helm. The impact of the probability
of managerial turnover on the optimal organizational design further reduces the manager’s
bargaining power.
Other theories of bureaucracy do not share the prediction that bureaucracy and manage-
rial turnover are positive correlated. For instance, in Tirole (1986), bureaucracy arises as a
mechanism to limit collusion between employees and their supervisors. As Tirole points out
in page 201, “Keeping relationships short has the advantage of restricting side transfers and,
thus, of limiting the inﬂuence of coalitions in organizations.” Since a probability of manage-
rial turnover obviously shortens the life of relationships in the ﬁrm, Tirole’s model predicts a
negative correlation between bureaucracy and managerial turnover.
Bureaucracy and leverage
Although Proposition 3 demonstrates that managerial rents decrease with the probability
of managerial turnover, adopting a policy of periodically replacing the management is not
necessarily in shareholders’ interest. In fact, diﬀerentiating the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts (the
value function of Program (13)) with respect to the probability of managerial turnover yields
−(1 − φ){V (λ?,σ) − V (λ?, ¯ σ)} < 0.
Other things equal, it is not optimal for shareholders to commit to a positive probability
of managerial turnover.
22Nonetheless, Gilson (1989) shows that, in his sample of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms, 52%
of the managers lose their jobs. Harris and Raviv (1990) provide one justiﬁcation for such a
high turnover rate: Financial distress conveys a negative signal of the incumbent manager’s
ability, increasing the likelihood that it is optimal for shareholders to replace the incumbent
management.
In this setting, leverage implies a positive probability of managerial turnover that is un-
related to the manager’s quitting threat. Since the probability of ﬁnancial distress increases
with the ﬁrm’s debt, Proposition 3 implies that more levered ﬁrms are more bureaucratic and
their managers enjoy lower rents.
Committing not to renegotiate salaries
One could argue that, instead of bureaucratizing the ﬁrm to reduce managerial rents, the
Board might be able to solve the rent extraction problem more eﬃciently by committing
not to renegotiate the manager’s incentive scheme. Free from the rent extraction problem,
the Board could assure the eﬃcient organizational design by making the manager’s salary
contingent on the organizational choice. An important question, thus, is whether ﬁrms can
easily commit not to renegotiate the manager’s salary.
As Stole and Zwiebel (1996) point out, labor contracts are non binding in nature and im-
portant employees have the ability to bargain directly with the Board. Moreover, a manager’s
ability to extract rents is not limited to her monetary compensation. By using the quitting
threat, a manager may extract more perks or other indirect beneﬁts from the corporation.
Since it is diﬃcult to imagine that a Board could commit along all these dimensions, a mecha-
nism that commits the company to a speciﬁc wage schedule may not eliminate the manager’s
incentive to distort the organization. If so, reducing managerial agency costs may lead the
23Board to bureaucratize the ﬁrm.8
7 Conclusions
In the economics literature, the term “bureaucracy” has been associated with ex-ante optimal
constraints on the employee’s actions: the requirement to work in the company’s facilities,
the denial of access to superiors, etc. In this literature, bureaucracy implies that information
is either destroyed or ignored. Yet, the term ‘bureaucracy’ is often associated with a system
that generates rather than destroys information. Not only is this the sense of Weber’s opening
quote, but also the widespread perception that the recording of corporate actions and the ﬁling
of forms make a company “too bureaucratic”. Consistent with this idea, this paper explores
the role of bureaucracy in generating information.
In our framework, the extent to which ﬁrms document their actions emerges from a trade
oﬀ between the gains of improving incentives and production eﬃciency. On the one hand,
the recording of actions allows for input-based measures of performance that increase the
eﬀectiveness of the ﬁrm’s system of incentives. On the other hand, recording actions and
ﬁling reports cost time and eﬀort that could be used to enhance production. We show that
managerial agency problems induce shareholders to bias this trade-oﬀ toward the beneﬁts
of improving incentives. Companies become overly bureaucratized and internal accounting
systems, which may be the best example of using resources for documenting corporate events,
are likely to be prioritized.
8An anecdotal case may help illustrate the pressure to renegotiate. Stewart (1991) reports that, after the
debacle of Michael Milken, Drexel guaranteed its main traders the same level of the previous year bonuses
(regardless of their performance). Probably, the oﬀer was an attempt to avoid the departure of valuable
employees, who might fear that their performance would be jeopardized by Drexel’s ﬁnancial distress.
24Perhaps more importantly, our analysis shows that the system of incentives of more bu-
reaucratized ﬁrms relies more strongly on input-based performance measures. As a result,
the model yields a measure of bureaucracy — the extent to which employees’ pay depends on
measures of input rather than output — which we believe that can be used to test the model’s
implications that relate the level of bureaucracy to ﬁrms’ leverage and to the frequency of
managerial turnover.
25Appendix
The proofs for Propositions 1, 2, and 3 follow.
Proof of Proposition 1.
It suﬃces to prove that, under Assumption 1,
∂β2(λ,σ)









































Proof of Proposition 2.
A straightforward application of the envelope theorem on equation (6) yields




2(λ, ¯ σ)λ = rλ[β2(λ, ¯ σ) + β2(λ,σ)][β2(λ, ¯ σ) − β2(λ,σ)] > 0,
where the inequality holds because, from Proposition 1,
∂β2(λ,σ)
∂σ > 0.
It then follows that φ{V (λ
eff,σ) − V (λ
eff, ¯ σ)} < φ{V (λ,σ) − V (λ, ¯ σ)} for any λ > λ
eff, where
λ
eff is the most bureaucratized organizational design that maximizes ﬁrm value. This result and
V (λ
eff,σ)−Γ(λ
eff) ≥ V (λ,σ)−Γ(λ) for any λ 6= λ





eff, ¯ σ)} > V (λ,σ) − Γ(λ) − φ{V (λ,σ) − V (λ, ¯ σ)} for any λ > λ
eff, proving that λsb ≤ λ
eff.
To show that the optimal organizational design implies that the ﬁrm is overly bureaucratized (i.e.,
λsb < λ






















eff, ¯ σ)], (A2)
where the ﬁrst two terms in equation (A2) vanish by construction of λ
eff.
In section 4, we showed that
∂
2V (λ,σ)









eff, ¯ σ)] < 0. Therefore, expected proﬁts increase if the
organizational choice changes from λ
eff to λ
eff −  with  > 0 suﬃciently small.
26Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Deﬁne Ψ(Π,λ) = (1−Π)∂V
∂λ (λ,σ)+Π∂V




∂λ (λ, ¯ σ)]. Thus, the ﬁrst
order condition of the Board’s maximization problem (equation (14)) can be written as Ψ(Π,λ?) = 0.







. Since λ? solves the
maximization problem that leads to Ψ(Π,λ?) = 0,
∂Ψ(Π,λ
?)
∂λ < 0, which implies that dλ
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∂λ when ¯ σ > σ.
To complete the proof, let R(Π) = φ(1 − Π)(V (λ?,σ) − V (λ?, ¯ σ)) be the manager’s rent under
the optimal organizational design. Therefore, dR








∂λ } − φ[V (λ?,σ) −








∂λ > 0, and V (λ?,σ) −
V (λ?, ¯ σ) > 0.
Q.E.D.
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